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Ayer: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS
Much has been written about the Maritime Strategy developed by the U.S. Navy
in the 1980s to counter Soviet ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) operations in
a major war. Less attention has been given to its intelligence backstory. Bradford
Dismukes, in “The Return of Great-Power Competition: Cold War Lessons about
Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication,”
analyzes the failure of the Navy in the 1970s to understand the essentially defensive posture of the Soviet SSBN force in its northern “bastions,” and hence
the USN exaggeration of the Soviet naval threat to NATO’s sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic. Dismukes argues that we must be careful not to
repeat this error in designing naval forces and strategies to counter the Russian
(or Chinese) navy today. Bradford Dismukes is a former U.S. naval intelligence
officer and long-standing student of the Soviet navy.
The reemergence of great-power competition is also the premise of James A.
Russell’s “Twenty-First Century Innovation Pathways for the U.S. Navy in the Age
of Competition.” Beginning with a brief review of the two great historical eras of
American naval innovation, with their effective adaptation to the strategic and
fiscal realities of the day, he then focuses on the broad failure of the Navy in the
1990s to design and build a fleet adequate to the demands of the twenty-first century. Faulting in particular the innovative yet problem-plagued littoral combat
ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class aircraft carrier, he argues that the
Navy missed an opportunity to anticipate the era of unmanned systems that is
now so rapidly upon us. James A. Russell is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California.
James Kraska and Yusuke Saito, in “The Law of Military Operations and SelfDefense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” provide a valuable analysis of a potential fault
line in America’s alliance with Japan that perhaps is not recognized sufficiently.
In the United States, of course, the executive branch as personified in the president has considerable leeway to respond to military crises on its own; in Japan,
reflecting the constitutional legacy of its defeat in World War II, a variety of contingencies involving the commitment of Japanese military forces require formal
approval by the Japanese Diet. It is critical that these differences and their effects
be understood fully on both sides and reflected in operational planning. James
Kraska is chairman of the Stockton Center for International Law at the Naval
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War College; Commander Yusuke Saito is a legal officer in the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force.
War termination is an underappreciated and understudied aspect of war. One
has only to look at the performance of the U.S. government in the aftermath of
its recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to be convinced of this. The story of the
management of the end of World War II in the Pacific is a great object lesson in
this regard. In “Conditional Surrender: Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945,”
Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira present an unusual analysis of these
events from the perspectives of both the victor and the vanquished. As the title of
the piece suggests, the American victory may have been unconditional as far as
the Japanese military was concerned, but the translation of military victory into
strategic success had everything to do with America’s acceptance of one “condition”: retention of the Japanese emperor, as titular head of state. The authors call
attention to the fact that both American and Japanese decision-making in the final
stage of the war featured sharp internal disagreements. The emperor’s decisive
embrace of the arguments of the Japanese “peace party” following the shocks of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with the Americans’ acceptance of his continuing role in the Japanese polity, was decisive for the (in retrospect) amazing success of the postwar settlement, and, for that matter, the durability of an alliance
relationship that continues today—as is evidenced by, among other things, this
coauthored article (as well as the previous one). Richard J. Shuster is a professor
at the Naval War College; Rear Admiral, retired, Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF, is a
senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.
In other matters, a perusal of our masthead will show that some routine rotation has occurred in the membership of our advisory board. The Naval War
College and the Press thank off-going members Adam Bellow, Gale A. Mattox,
Robert A. Silano, and Marin Strmecki most sincerely for their long years of yeoman service, and welcome aboard Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Geoffrey
Till, and Francis J. West, with thanks for their willingness to serve.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex. For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to
meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead
of time (401-841-2236).
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